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At the root of the North-South cooperation gap in Italy
Preferences or beliefs?∗
Maria Bigoni, Stefania Bortolotti, Marco Casari and Diego Gambetta
Abstract
The sharp gap in development between the North and the South of Italy represents a paradig-
matic case of persistent within-country disparities. The evidence suggests that this gap could
depend on a difference in the ability to cooperate. We investigate experimentally three possible
sources of this difference, and find that Northerners and Southerners share the same pro-social
preferences, but differ both in their belief about cooperativeness and in the aversion to social
risk – respectively more pessimistic and stronger among Southerners. Intervention or events
that reduced pessimistic beliefs should directly boost cooperation.
Keywords. Betrayal aversion, conditional cooperation, experiments, Italy.
JEL codes: C72, C93, Z13
Stark regional disparities in income are commonly found in many countries, (Ezcurra and
Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2013) and policies aimed at reducing within-country differences have com-
manded much effort and attention in Europe and elsewhere. Cohesion polices typically focus
on equalizing opportunities and welfare conditions across areas, neglecting the possibility that
people in different regions may, for a variety of causes, react differently to similar institutions
and opportunities (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011; Bigoni et al., 2016; Rustagi and Veronesi, 2016).
Here we explore two such causes, namely differences in preferences and expectations across
regions. We focus on the Italian North-South divide, a widely-debated case of seemingly in-
tractable within-country differences (Banfield and Fasano, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993; Guiso
et al., 2004; Cartocci, 2007; Buonanno et al., 2009; Nannicini et al., 2013). Previous studies
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record a resilient behavioural difference in cooperation that holds even if variations in geogra-
phy, informal institutions, and incentives are experimentally suppressed, and after controlling
for socio-demographic characteristics: the ability to cooperate is lower in the South than in the
North of Italy (Bigoni et al., 2016).1 Through a set of experiments, in this paper we explore the
behavioural roots of the North-South gap in cooperation. We consider three main conjectures,
related to: (i) preferences for conditional cooperation; (ii) beliefs about the cooperation of oth-
ers; and (iii) aversion to social risk.
Our first conjecture is that the North-South gap could be determined by a difference in
the prevalence of conditional cooperators across Italy. Conditional cooperators are willing to
cooperate provided that other people cooperate as well, so they act pro-socially not out of sheer
altruism, but of a reciprocal response to others’ actions (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Conditional
cooperators are widespread in society, but their share varies greatly across and within countries
(Kocher et al., 2008; Rustagi and Veronesi, 2016). The prevalence of conditional cooperators
also correlates with the ability to establish and sustain large-scale cooperation (Rustagi et al.,
2010). The actual behaviour of conditional cooperators depends on their beliefs on others’ co-
operation as well as on their propensity to bear the risk of being exploited, to which we turn next.
Our second conjecture is that Southerners’ expectations on others’ cooperation could be
more pessimistic than those of Northerners. Taking expectations into consideration is crucial:
consider for instance the extreme case of a population of perfect conditional cooperators. Here,
beliefs become self-confirming prophecies. If everyone expects that most of the others will coop-
erate, they will indeed cooperate. If instead people expect others to free-ride, they will do the
same. Either way, expectations would be correct in equilibrium. The role of beliefs has been
shown to be important in the repeated interactions not only of perfect conditional cooperators,
but in that of heterogeneous players (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010). If expectations are dif-
ferent, the North-South gap could persist despite a similar frequency of conditional cooperators,
i.e. a similar presence of pro-social preferences.
Our third conjecture is that the North-South gap in cooperation could be driven by a dif-
1Battiston and Gamba (2016) find a similar gap.
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ference in betrayal aversion, that is, the aversion to the risk of being cheated. There is evidence
that people are more averse to social risk than to risk of nature, that is towards risk of equally
harmful events determined by mere chance rather than by others’ choices (Bohnet and Zeck-
hauser, 2004). Betrayal aversion seems to vary in intensity across societies (Bohnet et al., 2008).
In social dilemmas, betrayal aversion plays a relevant role because the fear to be exploited by
free riders could deter contributors (Cubitt et al., 2017).2 Consider, for instance, two condi-
tional cooperators with the same optimistic expectations but different attitudes toward social
risk. The one with a higher tolerance of social risk might cooperate in full, while the other,
perceiving the cost associated to being exploited as too high might decide not to contribute at
all.
These three mechanisms carry distinct policy implications. If Northerners and Southerners
share the same preference for conditional cooperation, but have different expectations about
others’ cooperation level, a shift in beliefs, generated for instance by migration or by a positive
political or institutional shock, could positively impact cooperation levels. If instead what mat-
ters is a difference in the strength and support of conditional cooperation, a change is harder to
achieve (as well as controversial) as it would involve reshaping individual preferences; it would
also imply a very long-term effort given the high degree of persistence due to the intergener-
ational transmission of preferences (Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Dohmen et al., 2012). In so far
betrayal aversion is a preference, the same conclusions would follow also if differences in betrayal
aversion were found to matter.
In order to disentangle the three factors that could contribute to the ability to achieve and
sustain cooperation, we designed two experiments. In Experiment 1, we study preferences for
conditional cooperation in a public good game holding expectations constant. In Experiment 2,
we study individual expectations on others’ cooperative behaviour, and betrayal aversion in a
trust game. The design and the results of the two experiments are presented in Section 2 and
3, respectively. Section 4 discusses our findings and concludes.
2Results in Cubitt et al. (2017) indicate that betrayal aversion is correlated with conditional cooperation only
through beliefs, being stronger among pessimistic conditional cooperators.
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1. Experiment 1 on Conditional Cooperation
1.1. Design
To measure conditional cooperation, we followed the design proposed by Fischbacher et al.
(2001).3 Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of N = 4, and received an endowment of
w = 20 tokens, which they could allocate between a group project (gi) – with a marginal per
capita return (α) of 0.4 – and a private account (w − gi). Earnings were determined as follows:
pii = w − gi + α
N∑
j=1
gj (1)
Each subject had to make two types of decisions. The first decision is the unconditional
choice of how many tokens to contribute to the group project. The second type of decisions
are a series of conditional contribution choices. Subjects had to indicate how many tokens they
were willing to contribute, given the average contribution to the group project of the other group
members. The scenarios for others’ contributions ranged from 0 to 20 tokens, in steps of 1 (i.e.,
strategy method). Each subject was paid only for one of his decisions. The relevant decision
for payment was the unconditional one for three members of each group. For the fourth group
member, selected at random, the relevant decision was the conditional choice corresponding to
the realised average contribution of the others. At the end of the session, subjects were informed
about their relevant decision, the total contributions to the group project, and their earnings.
Conditional contribution choices provide a generalised measure of social preferences in a Public
Good Game. Since we are eliciting answers for each possible contingency of others’ contribution
levels, the composition of the subject pool should not affect the choice profile.
1.2. Recruitment Strategy and Experimental Procedures
We recruited participant from the University of Bologna subject pool, which attracts students
from all Italian regions.4 The recruitment was aimed at covering the South and the North of
Italy, excluding the Centre; to this end, we invited only subjects born in a specific set of regions.
3After the conditional cooperation task, we also elicited time preferences, which will be analysed in a separate
paper (see instructions in the Online Appendix).
4Our study is not the first to rely on the subject pool of a single institution to draw inferences about behaviour
across cultures. Notable examples are Barr and Serra (2010) who relied on college students in Oxford and
Bornhorst et al. (2010) that investigated trust among European PhD students who moved to Italy for their
studies.
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Figure 1: North and South of Italy
Notes: Classification in North, Center, and South macro-regions follows the definitions of the National Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT). We had participants from all shaded regions, except Valle d’Aosta (North), the smallest
Italian region. 231 participants were born in the South and 193 in the North. In the analysis we excluded data
for the 24 participants born in the Central regions and 2 born abroad, and concentrate on the North-South gap.
The recruitment strategy and the procedures were the same for both Experiment 1 and Experi-
ment 2. The vast majority of participants in both experiments completed primary school in their
macro-area of origin (98% for the South, 91% for the North), and had at least one parent born
there (100% and 85% respectively), which suggests that they have absorbed the social norms of
the area where they come from.
We were able to recruit students scattered in all regions of North and South, which gives a
nation-wide dimension to the findings (Figure 1). Such an extensive coverage of the national
territory would be difficult with other approaches. Students represent a very homogeneous
population in terms of age and education level hence enhancing the control of the experiment.
College-educated participants are well suited to handle some complexities embedded in the
experimental designs, which instead would be an obstacle when using a representative sample
of the population. Here we focus on students who moved to Bologna to study, which may
raise issues of self-selection. Suppose, for instance, that students from the South who moved
to Bologna are more cooperative than those who stayed in the South. If that was true, our
experiment would overestimate the cooperation level of the Southerners. We cannot rule this
out completely. Still, a recent experiment on the college choices of high-school students from
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the South (Calabria) shows that, at the aggregate level, preferences for conditional cooperation
do not differ between those who moved to an University in the Centre-North of Italy and those
who stayed in the South (Casari et al., 2018).5
Procedures. Each subject participated in only one of the sessions of either Experiment 1 or
Experiment 2. Upon arrival, subjects were seated at a visually separated desk and no form of
communication was allowed during the session. The instructions were read aloud to ensure com-
mon knowledge and then subjects answered the control questions before engaging in the task.
At the end of the sessions, we administered a computerised questionnaire where we elicited
socio-demographic characteristics. Earnings were expressed in tokens and payments were made
in private. Recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was imple-
mented through z-Tree software applications (Fischbacher, 2007). The sessions were conducted
at the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social Sciences (BLESS) and at the Laboratorio
di Economia Sperimentale (LES) in Forl`ı.
Experiment 1 included 7 sessions with a number of participants ranging from 19 to 24, for
a total of 134 subjects.6 A session lasted on average about 1 hour. The conversion rate was 4
tokens per Euro and the overall average per-capita earnings were 18 Euros including a 4 Euros
show-up fee.7
1.3. Results for Experiment 1
Result 1 Participants from the South and from the North display a similar preference for con-
ditional cooperation.
Figure 2 and Table 1 provide support for Result 1. On average, participants’ contribution
increased with the contributions of others. Such link is present both for participants from the
North and from the South. These phenomenon is illustrated by the positive slope of the lines in
5In a 2-player public good game played with the strategy method (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
6We explicitly mention the geographical constraint in the recruitment message for the first sessions, while in
the last four sessions we were able to send the invitation exclusively to subjects born in the regions of interest,
thanks to an update of the recruitment software.
7Average per capita earnings in Experiment 1 include the time-preference task, not discussed here, which were
paid via bank transfer.
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Figure 2: Conditional Cooperation in the Public Good Game
Figure 2 and by the positive correlation at the individual level between own and others’ contribu-
tions (North: avg. corr. = 0.69, N = 52; South: avg. corr. = 0.71, N = 82). Participants from
the North, though, do not differ in a statistically significant manner from those from the South
with respect to this correlation (p-value = 0.936, two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, NN = 41
and NS = 73).
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A regression analysis confirms these findings. Table 1 presents results from OLS regressions
explaining the level of contributions conditional on others’ choices when pooling participants
from the North and the South. In Model 1, we include the variable Others’ average contribution
and a set of controls. Others’ average contributions is positive and highly significant, hence
showing the presence of conditional cooperation. In Model 2, we include a dummy for those
born in the North and interact the variable Others’ average contributions with the North and
South dummies. The difference between the two estimated coefficients of the interacted vari-
ables is only marginally statistically significant (p-value=0.058). In Model 3 we replicate the
regression of Model 2 on a rooted sample, which is restricted to subjects who have completed
the primary school in the macro-region of birth, and have at least one parent born in the same
macro-region. In this case no significant difference emerges between the behaviour of subjects
8The correlation is based on a Spearman test and this measure is not defined for all observations.
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Table 1: Regression on Conditional Cooperation
Dep. var.: Contribution to PGG Entire sample Rooted sample
for a given contribution of others Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Others’ average contribution 0.495***
(0.011)
Others’ average contribution x
North
0.469*** 0.469***
(0.018) (0.021)
Others’ average contribution x
South
0.512*** 0.506***
(0.014) (0.014)
North -0.569 -1.365
(1.088) (1.252)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.603*** 5.509*** 5.758***
(1.093) (1.100) (1.126)
N.obs., N.subjects 2814, 134 2814, 134 2541, 121
R2 0.255 0.259 0.265
Notes: OLS regression with individual level random-effects. Controls: Male takes value 1 for
males and 0 for females. Experiment run in Forl´ı takes value 1 for the sessions run in the
Forl´ı campus and 0 for the sessions run in the Bologna campus of the University of Bologna.
Low task comprehension: to account for participants’ understanding of instructions, we use the
answering time and the number of mistakes they did in the control questions. We classified the
task comprehension as low for those subjects who were in the last decile according either to their
total answering time, or to their total number of mistakes (this measure was built at the session
level). The Impulsivity score ranges from 0 to 3 and is the total score in a non-incentivised
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), while the Logic score ranges from 0 to 2 and is
based on a simplified version of the Raven’s progressive matrices test (not incentivised). ∗ ∗ ∗
statistical significance at the 1% level.
from North and South (p-value = 0.247). Result 1 holds after controlling for gender, task com-
prehension, cognitive skills and a variety of other confounding factors.
This aggregate behaviour is compatible with a variety of individual patterns of conditional
cooperation. For this reason, we classify subjects into four types. Following Fischbacher et al.
(2001), we label a subject as a conditional cooperator if he has a highly significant (p-value ≤
1%) and positive Spearman rank correlation coefficient or his contribution pattern is monoton-
ically increasing. A free-rider is a subject that always contributes 0. An altruist is a subject
who always contributes more than 15 tokens, unconditionally on others’ contributions. Over-
all, about two thirds of the subjects are conditional contributors, with similar shares in both
macro-regions (62% in the North and 70% in the South). About 7% of the subjects matched
exactly other’s contributions. The percentage of free-riders among the Northerners (17%) is
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almost twice as large as the percentage among the Southerners (9%). Altruists account only for
a very small fraction of the population (2% in both macro-areas).9 The distribution of types is
not significantly different across macro-regions (Fischer exact test: p-value = 0.466, NN = 52
and NS = 82).
10 Quite interestingly, also free-riders can contribute to sustain cooperation as
they foresee potential gains in maintaining optimistic expectations among conditional cooper-
ators (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010). This element could be especially pronounced in field
situations where social dilemmas are played sequentially. While free-riders would not contribute
when they are last movers, they may fully contribute as first mover in an attempt to entice con-
ditional cooperators to contribute. For instance, some free riders could decide to start sweeping
the sidewalk to send a signal to conditional cooperators and hence induce them to follow through.
To sum up, the evidence from Experiment 1 shows that the average subject is conditionally
cooperative and the strength of this preference is similar among Northerners and Southerners.
In a society of conditional cooperators the actual cooperation level in a public good game
depends from the strength of cooperative preferences as well as from people’s beliefs about
others’ contribution behaviour. In line with previous evidence, we report that the average subject
exhibits imperfect conditional cooperation, which means that an extra unit of contribution
by all others would induce the average subject to increase her contribution by less than one
unit (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Actual contributions, though, also directly depend on people’s
beliefs about others’ contributions (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010), and optimistic beliefs can
compensate for the imperfect responsiveness from conditionally cooperative preferences. In
general, the observed level of cooperation in a society can vary considerably depending on
the combined effect of conditionally cooperative preferences and expectations about others’
behaviour. The Italian regional gap in cooperation could well originate from different levels
of expectations about others’ contribution. We explore this mechanism in Experiment 2. In
addition, Experiment 2 also studies tolerance for social risk, which could – independently from
or jointly with expectations – shape the ability of a society to achieve cooperative outcomes.
919% of the participants are not classified according to any of the three types.
10In the unconditional decision, subjects contributed on average about half of their endowment (10.49). Con-
tributions were slightly higher among Southerners than Northerners (10.74 vs. 10.08), but the difference was
not statistically significant (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.579, NN = 52 and NS = 82). OLS
regressions provide similar results. Contrary to Bigoni et al. (2016), here participants were interacting with oth-
ers from all parts of Italy. The geographical composition of the group could indeed affect beliefs about others’
contributions and therefore unconditional cooperation.
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2. Experiment 2 on Beliefs and Betrayal Aversion
2.1. Design
In Experiment 2 we elicited betrayal aversion (Part 1) and then beliefs about the ability to
cooperate in the North and South of Italy (Part 2). For the sake of exposition, we reverse the
order in which we present the tasks.
Beliefs. We asked subjects to estimate the cooperation levels realised in a previous experi-
ment run in the North and South of Italy. The task was a Public Good Game run in separate
sessions in the city of Cuneo and Crotone with a representative sample of the Italian population
(Figure 1). Before eliciting beliefs, we read the instructions of the original experiment (Bigoni
et al., 2016) where it was publicly announced that all participants were born and resident in the
province where the experiment was conducted.11 In the original experiment, subjects interacted
for 8 rounds in groups of N = 4 strangers (random matching).12
Each participant had to provide two estimates of the average contribution across 8 rounds,
one for Cuneo, the other for Crotone.13 An estimate had to be an integer number between 0 and
20 tokens. We randomly selected two subjects from the original experiment, one from Crotone,
the other from Cuneo. These two random draws were repeated for every session of Experiment
2 to limit information leakage across sessions. Everyone was paid according to one of the two
estimates, selected at random, which was then compared to the actual contribution of a single
subject taken from the original experiment. Belief elicitation was incentivised by means of a
quadratic scoring rule (see the Online Appendix). A subjects could earn up to 26 tokens for an
accurate estimate (+/− 1 token). Deviations larger than 5 tokens yielded zero tokens.
Betrayal aversion. This part comprised two between-subjects treatments – Trust and Risky
Dictator – based on the experimental set-up proposed by Bohnet et al. (2008).14 Subjects inter-
11We read the Part 2 instructions from the PGG session of Bigoni et al. (2016), and asked subjects to answer
the same control questions.
12Payoffs were as in Expression (1) with w = 20, α = 0.5, and gi = 0, 6, 14, or 20.
13The list of cities was not disclosed in advance, to avoid any demand effect. The order of the cities was
randomised within each session. For each estimate, subjects could see on their screen a map of Italy showing the
city location.
14We departed from Bohnet et al. (2008) as we used a different payoff structure, rewrote the instructions, and
did not run the treatment where subjects played a lottery against nature (i.e. the Decision Problem).
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acted in pairs with a first mover (blue) and a second mover (red). Pair matching and roles were
randomly determined.15 Betrayal aversion is measured as the difference in the average choice of
the first movers between the Trust and the Risky Dictator treatment.
In the Trust treatment – meant to capture preferences toward social risk – blue faces alter-
natives A and B (Figure 3). Under alternative A both subjects earn 10 tokens and red takes no
decision. Under alternative B, earnings in the pair depend on the choice of red, who can choose
between options 1 or 2. Option 1 delivers 15 tokens to both subjects while with option 2 blue
earns 8 tokens and red earns 22.
The implementation of the game is such that blue (first mover) does not directly choose
between the alternatives A and B, but states under which circumstances he prefers A over B.
More precisely, he states a number between 0 and 100 that indicates the minimum percentage of
red (second movers) choosing option 1 that he requires in order to prefer the “risky” alternative
B over the “safe” alternative A. This threshold number is called the minimum acceptable proba-
bility (MAP, henceforth). Red always makes a choice, without knowing blue’s choice in advance.
To determine the outcome of the game for a specific pair of subjects, and their payoffs, at the
end of each session one needs to compare the MAP chosen by the blue player in the pair with
the realised percentage of second movers choosing option 1 in the whole session (p, henceforth).
Alternative A was implemented in the pair if the session’s p was smaller than the MAP, and
alternative B otherwise.16
The Risky Dictator treatment is meant to capture preferences toward the risk of nature.
It is alike the Trust treatment, with one difference: reds (second movers) are passive players
because their actions are determined by a random draw. The probability of option 1 or 2 being
selected was unbeknown to the subjects, and it was determined by the share of second movers’
choices observed in one previous session of the Trust treatment. Feedback for the Trust and
Risky Dictator tasks were given at the end of the session to avoid any possible carry over effect
(see Section 1.2. for detailed procedures).
15Red and blue subjects were in the same room and read the same instructions.
16At the end of the experiments, everyone observed the outcome in his pair.
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Figure 3: Trust Treatment
A risk-neutral payoff-maximiser would chose a MAP of about 29%. To see this, one should
equalise the certain payoff of 10 from Alternative A to the expected payoff from alternative
B, 15p + 8(1 − p), where p denotes the probability that option 1 is selected. The MAP is the
probability p that solves this equation. A person with no aversion to betrayal would state the
same MAP in the Trust and Risky Dictator treatments. A person that is averse to betrayal
would state a higher MAP in the Trust than in the Risky Dictator treatment.
Procedures. Experiment 2 involved 290 subjects (141 from the North and 149 from the
South), divided in 16 sessions; session participants ranged from 10 to 31. Earnings were expressed
in tokens. The conversion rate was 2 tokens per Euro and the overall average per-capita earnings
were 14 Euros, including a 4 Euros show-up fee (see Section 1.2. for other details).
2.2. Results for Experiment 2
Result 2 Participants expect higher cooperation in the North than in the South.
Support for Result 2 comes from Figure 4 and Table 2. There is a widespread belief that peo-
ple in Cuneo (North) contribute in a Public Good Game more than people in Crotone (South)
and this difference is statistically significant (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 0.001,
N = 290). More precisely, the average estimate is 10.01 tokens for Cuneo, and 8.90 tokens for
Crotone. This belief is shared among participants from both the North and the South (two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p-value = 0.003, N = 141; p < 0.001, N = 149, respectively).
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This result is confirmed by regressions in Table 2. Subjects on average believe that con-
tributions are 1.1 tokens higher in Cuneo than in Crotone (Model 1). In Model 2, we include
a dummy for people who were born in the North, and interact the variable Cuneo with North
and South dummies. The difference between the two estimated coefficients of the interacted
variables is not statistically significant (p-value=0.836). This result holds even if we restrict the
sample to subjects rooted in their macro-area (Model 3, p-value=0.769).
Figure 4: Beliefs about Cooperation
Notes: the vertical dashes report the average contribution levels observed in Bigoni et al. (2016). The whiskers
denote 90% confidence intervals.
Result 3 Participants from the South display a significant aversion to betrayal.
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 3. Following Bohnet et al. (2008) we say that there is
betrayal aversion if the minimum acceptable probability stated in the Trust treatment is higher
than in the Risky Dictator treatment. We measure betrayal aversion at the aggregate level, and
not at the individual level, because of the between-subject design.
Subjects from the South of Italy display a substantial degree of betrayal aversion (62.1 −
49.0 = 13.1 percentage points, N = 72) which is statistically significant (two-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p-value = 0.027, NT = 38 and NRD = 36). The degree of betrayal aversion
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Table 2: Regression on Beliefs about Cooperation
Dep.var.: Belief about avg. contrib. Entire sample Rooted
in a PGG in Cuneo or Crotone Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Cuneo 1.110***
(0.251)
North 0.090 0.007
(0.514) (0.559)
Cuneo x North 1.057*** 1.106***
(0.361) (0.399)
Cuneo x South 1.161*** 1.262***
(0.351) (0.352)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 8.193*** 8.161*** 7.937***
(0.578) (0.598) (0.622)
N.obs., N.subjects 580, 290 580, 290 516, 258
R2 0.059 0.059 0.076
Notes: OLS regression with individual-level random effects. Every subject makes two esti-
mates. See notes to Table 1 for a description of Controls. Default location is Crotone (South).
∗ ∗ ∗ statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 3: Regression on Betrayal Aversion
Dep. var.: MAP in Trust Entire sample Rooted
and Risky Dictator treatments Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Trust treatment 10.374**
(4.091)
North 4.862 4.914
(6.156) (6.627)
Trust treatment x North 6.905 10.581
(6.029) (7.033)
Trust treatment x South 13.285** 13.157**
(5.567) (5.586)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 39.001*** 37.859*** 37.691***
(6.229) (6.407) (6.667)
N.obs. 146 146 128
R2 0.081 0.086 0.110
Notes: OLS regression. One observation per subject. See notes to Table 1 for a
description of Controls. Default decision refers to the Risky Dictator treatment.
∗ ∗ ∗ and ∗∗ statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
among subjects from the North is much smaller (60.6− 57.8 = 2.8 percentage points, N = 74)
and is not statistically significant (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.552, NT = 40
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and NRD = 32).
These results are confirmed by the OLS regressions presented in Table 3. Model 1 shows that
overall participants display betrayal aversion. Models 2 and 3 reveal that betrayal aversion is
significant only for subjects from the South (Trust treatment × South). According to an F-test,
however, the degree of betrayal aversion does not significantly differ among Southerners and
Northerners (p-value = 0.436 for Model 2, p-value = 0.773 for Model 3).
3. Discussion and Conclusions
Our study reveals that the gap in ability to cooperate between the North and South of Italy
does not lie in differences in pro-social preferences. Surprisingly in view of popular narratives,
the level of conditional cooperation we found among people from the South is similar to that
of people from the North. In a Public Good Game experiment people from both macro-regions
respond to an increase in the contribution of others in ways that are statistically indistinguish-
able. In theory, self-selection could be an issue, but the evidence we have on college choice of
Italian students allays this concern (Casari et al., 2018).
The cause of the difference in cooperative ability lies elsewhere. First, Northerners and
Southerners differ in their betrayal aversion, which is present among the latter, but negligible
among the former. The pattern of statistical significance, based on the behaviour in a Trust
Game, however, is inconclusive: betrayal aversion differs significantly from zero among South-
erners but not among Northerners, yet the two values do not significantly differ from each other.
The low number of subjects (ca. 70) may have something to do with this. It is nonetheless
tempting to speculate on this result as it seems a promising avenue of further study. A more
intense aversion to betrayal could be due to engrained conventional values that hold people who
are cheated in lower esteem than people who cheat – “fool me once shame on me.” Or it could
be a response to higher expected cost of being cheated, the fear of having to bear the cost of
redress and reputation re-building personally rather than rely on public or social justice.
In conclusion, the regional difference in behaviour is not rooted in individual pro-social
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preferences, as Banfield suggested. What matters are the differences in betrayal aversion and,
above all, in the beliefs about others’ cooperative behavior: our more robust result puts the
responsibility for cooperation disparities squarely on the more pessimistic expectations that
Southerners have about other Southerners’ contribution, displayed in the Public Good Game,
than Northerners have about other Northerners’.
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Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article: Appendix
A: Experimental Instructions
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